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Abstract 
This study employs unique household data collected in cyclone-affected 
communities in Bangladesh to uncover the impact of religious fractionalisation on 
victimization to crime after the disaster. The identification strategy relies on two 
natures of the study area: 1) the religious composition is stable; and 2) the 
pre-disaster socio-economic status of households is uncorrelated with religious 
fractionalisation and disaster damage, after controlling for the observed 
characteristics. The findings suggest that following a natural disaster, households 
in disaster-affected and religiously fractionalised communities are more likely to 
be victims than those in non-fractionalised communities. This is caused by the 
misallocation of disaster reliefs in fractionalised communities. 
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1. Introduction 
Natural disasters cause multifaceted damages to affected communities, including the 
persistent effects on health status and education. Increases in crimes such as theft and 
rape are also serious issues (Harper and Frailing 2010). Individuals affected by disasters 
suffer from a decline in income and difficulties in smoothing consumption. The 
probability of crime detection also decreases in the affected areas. These incentives to 
commit crime aggravate crime incidences in both developed and developing countries. 
For example, in the month after Hurricane Katrina, the burglary rate increased by 
402.9% compared to the month before the disaster event (Frailing and Harper, 2010). 
However, it is also claimed that disasters may give rise to altruism, and norms of 
reciprocity that reduce or stabilize crimes (Barsky et al. 2006; Fischer 1998; Fritz 1961; 
Quarantelli 1994; Rodriguez et al. 2006; Goltz 1984). Since the post-disaster crimes 
cause the delay of post-disaster rehabilitation (Aldrich, 2012), it is important for 
policymakers to understand under which situations disasters trigger the crimes. 
Nevertheless, rigorous quantitative analyses on the post-disaster crime are 
scarce. Exceptionally, Bignon et al. (2016) and Mehlum et al. (2006) analyse the impact 
of disaster shocks on increasing property crime by using historical data on Europe. 
Miguel (2005) finds that disasters increase homicide of unproductive household 
members in Tanzania. Miguel et al. (2004) also show the positive association between 
the rainfall shock and civil conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) present that man-made 
disasters such as civil wars increase homicide. On the contrary, Cassar et al. (2011) 
show that experiencing natural disasters foster social trust. Siegel et al. (1999) and 
Zahran et al. (2009) examine the disaster impact on crimes and find mixed results. 
While these studies are insightful, they do not discuss the heterogeneity of a disaster 
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effect across the communities, despite the observed variation in the crime rate across the 
affected regions. As Glaeser et al. (1996) claim, the most intriguing aspect of crime is its 
astoundingly high variance across time and space. This study aims at addressing this 
question. 
One likely explanation for the heterogeneous effect is grounded in the ethnic 
and religious fractionalisation of the community.1 Fractionalisation aggravates the 
governance (Mauro, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003), economic 
inequality (Kelly, 2000; Bénabou, 2005; Alesina et al., 2016; Dev et al., 2016), and 
riots/conflicts (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Field et al., 2008; Esteban et al., 
2012). Fractionalisation also affects the spending on productive public goods (Alesina et 
al., 1999). Social sanction cannot be imposed effectively in such communities (Miguel 
and Gugerty, 2005). Furthermore, fractionalisation leads to the decline in social 
preference (Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2004; Charness and Gneezy, 2008) and social 
capital (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002). Criminologists also claim that 
fractionalisation is a driver of social disorganisation (Shaw and McKay, 1942; 
Kornhauser, 1978; Sampson, 1987).2 These effects potentially exacerbate the risk of 
post-disaster crimes. Consistently, there is evidence that the communities with lower 
social capital suffer from severer disaster damages and the delay of post-disaster 
rehabilitation (Aldrich and Meyer 2015, Dynes 2006, Klinenberg 2003, Nakagawa and 
Shaw 2004, Tse et al. 2013). However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no 
empirical study arguing that fractionalisation is a driver of post-disaster crime.3 
                                                   
1 In this paper, a community is defined as religiously fractionalised when it consists of 
multiple religious groups. 
2 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a further review. 
3 Alternatively, the peer effects may also explain the disparity of crime rate across the 
5 
 
This study bridges the gap in the literature by conducting two closely related 
analyses. First, the study evaluates the impact of religious fractionalisation on the risk of 
crime victimisation after a cyclone in rural Bangladesh. Second, it disentangles four 
channels through which religious fractionalisation increases post-disaster crimes: the 
misallocation of disaster reliefs, inefficient risk-sharing arrangement, high income 
inequality, and political tension. There are particular insights to be gained from 
analysing the context of rural Bangladesh; Bangladesh is a disaster-prone country and is 
marked by a history of significant religious tension, which remains today (Alexander et 
al., 2016).  
This study employs a unique household survey data collected after cyclone Aila, 
which struck south-western Bangladesh in May 2009. The data were collected from 427 
households in 24 communities, of which 11 consist of multiple religions. In quantifying 
the post-disaster crime incidence, this study examines property and violent crimes 
occurred during the 18 months after the cyclone attack. Specifically, I employ the crime 
victimisation data at the household level in order to mitigate the under-reporting 
problem. The use of household-level data rather than regional-level data has two 
advantages: first, it enables us to identify who particularly suffers from victimisation in 
fractionalised communities; and second, it allows us to disentangle the underlying 
mechanism.  
The identification strategy of this study relies on two natures of the study area.4 
First, the religious composition is stable over the decades. Second, the socio-economic 
                                                                                                                                                     
affected areas. However, there is no consensus on whether the peer effect in crime 
indeed exists; while some empirical studies have found evidence on significant peer 
effects (Glaeser et al., 1996; Zenou, 2003; Bayer et al., 2009), others have not (Ludwig 
and Kling, 2007; Dahl and DellaVigna, 2009). 
4 This strategy is similar with Miguel and Gugerty (2005) and Egel (2013). 
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status of households in the pre-cyclone period is uncorrelated with the religious 
fractionalisation and disaster damage at the community level, after controlling for the 
observed characteristics. Exploiting these natures, this study analyses the impact of 
interaction between religious fractionalisation and cyclone damage at the community 
level on the post-disaster victimisation at the household level.  
The result shows that the impact of cyclone damage on the victimisation risk is 
significantly larger in religiously fractionalised communities. In particular, the 
socio-economically vulnerable households, such as religious minorities and the landless, 
are more likely to be victimised in fractionalised communities. I also find supporting 
evidence that the high victimisation risk is driven by the misallocation of disaster reliefs 
in fractionalised communities. However, the results do not support the effect of the 
remaining three channels. 
The contribution of this study to the literature is two-fold. First, households in 
developing countries use various risk-coping strategies to smooth their consumption 
against negative shocks. In particular, poor households face no choice but to take costly 
strategies that may lead to the decline in their short- and long-term livelihood. Such 
strategies include the reduction of human capital investment (Jacoby and Skoufias, 
1997), engagement in risk-taking behaviour, including theft (Fafchamps and Minten, 
2006; Robinson and Yeh, 2011), dissaving of productive assets (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 
1993; Hoddinott, 2006; Sultana and Mallick 2015), dependency on moneylenders (Shoji, 
2008; 2012), natural resource extraction (Takasaki et al., 2004; McSweeney, 2005), and 
the reduction of intra-household resource allocation to unproductive members (Behrman 
and Deolalikar, 1990; Rose, 1999; Miguel, 2005; Shoji, 2010). The finding of the 
present study that the households commit crimes as a consumption smoothing device is 
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in line with these studies. Second, it has been argued that the ethnic/religious 
fractionalisation of communities has a negative effect on the formation of social capital 
because of the difficulties in coordination among the community members (Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2000). However, this study provides an alternative explanation that poor 
governance and misallocation of disaster reliefs in fractionalised communities trigger 
crimes, and this may, in turn, decrease social capital.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the 
relationship between religious fractionalisation and post-disaster crime. Sections 3 and 4 
describe the study site and dataset, respectively. Section 5 evaluates the impact of 
religious fractionalisation on crime victimisation, and Section 6 uncovers the underlying 
mechanisms. Finally, Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2. Conceptual framework  
This section illustrates how the post-disaster situation triggers crime and this is 
particularly exacerbated in fractionalised communities. Becker’s (1968) seminal paper 
predicts that one’s willingness to commit crime increases with the payoff from illegal 
activity, while it decreases with the probability of crime detection, severity of 
punishment, and income from legal sources. Two factors are primarily responsible for 
increased crime incidences during disasters: first, people lose their income and have 
difficulty in finding alternative income-earning opportunities. It is also difficult to cope 
with the income loss by using risk-sharing arrangement and sales of assets. Second, the 
probability of crime detection could become low during the emergency situation. Thus, 
natural disasters tempt even those who do not normally violate the law to commit crime. 
 This situation could be particularly aggravated in fractionalised communities at 
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least through four channels. Although I explain each channel separately below, they are 
not mutually exclusive. First, the local governance may be exacerbated during the 
disasters, and this problem may be particularly severe in fractionalised communities. 
Therefore, the disaster-affected households in such communities may not be able to 
benefit from the disaster relief as much as those in non-fractionalised communities.5 In 
fact, Mahmud and Prowse (2012) find that the allocation of relief programs suffered 
from corruption during Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh. If this is the case, the households 
which are severely affected by the disaster but cannot receive the relief are likely to 
experience transient poverty. This potentially tempts them to commit crime to smooth 
consumption (Fafchamps and Minten, 2006; Cameron and Shah, 2014).  
Second, efficient risk sharing is difficult to be achieved in fractionalised 
communities, given the limited availability of social sanction (Miguel and Gugerty, 
2005) and lower altruism (Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2004; Charness and Gneezy, 2008).6 
Therefore, while the household consumption in non-fractionalised communities, where 
efficient risk sharing can be achieved, is affected only by the covariate component 
(community-level) of disaster shock, those in fractionalized communities cannot cope 
with the idiosyncratic (household-level) shock and therefore suffer from both covariate 
and idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, the incentive to commit crime during disasters 
becomes particularly higher in fractionalised communities.  
The third channel is through the increased income inequality. A person’s 
religion predicts his/her occupation in rural Bangladesh, implying high income 
                                                   
5 The governance is significantly associated with the targeting accuracy of reliefs in 
developing countries (Coady et al., 2004). 
6 Existing studies on risk sharing show that the arrangement is likely to be inefficient if 
the potential sanction against the deviation from the arrangement is lower (Ligon et al., 
2002) and if individuals are self-interested (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001). 
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inequality in religiously fractionalised communities (Ahmed, 2005). The inequality 
across religious groups is expected to become even larger during disasters, since poorer 
households are usually more vulnerable to disaster risks. As theoretically presented by 
Becker (1968) and Kornhauser (1978), and empirically tested by many researchers, 
economic inequality aggravates crime (Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Barslund et al., 2007; 
Gibson and Kim, 2008).  
Finally, religious fractionalisation may also trigger crime if it is associated with 
the heterogeneity of supporting political parties. Esteban and Ray (2011) and Esteban et 
al. (2012) argue that such heterogeneity is a cause of conflict in the community. Political 
tension may become particularly severe during disasters when the resources are scarce 
(Miguel et al., 2004). 
 
3. Study Site 
3.1. Religious fractionalisation 
The study site is Satkhira District in south-western Bangladesh. This country 
experienced two historical events in the mid-twentieth century. In 1947, two regions in 
India with a large population of Muslims were partitioned as West Pakistan (later 
Pakistan) and East Pakistan (later Bangladesh). This triggered violent attacks, such as 
looting and rape, against religious minorities in both the countries: Hindus in East 
Pakistan and Muslims in India. The situation was further exacerbated after the 
Indo-Pakistan war began and the Pakistani government enacted the Enemy Property Act 
in 1965. The act declared that all interests of the enemy in firms, companies, lands and 
buildings located in Pakistan were to be seized by the government. Furthermore, the 
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government designated Hindus as enemies of the state. This discriminatory legislation 
was used selectively to seize Hindu-owned property.  
Subsequently, the Liberation War broke out in 1971 and Bangladesh attained 
independence from Pakistan. The government of Bangladesh also enacted the 
discriminatory legislation in 1972, namely the Vested Property Act. The target of 
confiscation in this act included not only Hindus but also the Muslim supporters of West 
Pakistani regime, further exacerbating the violent attacks in Bangladesh. 
These violent attacks influenced the religious composition of Satkhira District. 
During the two partitions, approximately 20 million Muslims and Hindus have crossed 
the India-Bangladesh border, and a similar number were internally displaced within the 
national borders in order to shelter themselves from the violent attacks (Alexander et al., 
2016). The displaced people in Bangladesh and the refugees from India mainly settled 
down in the regions close to the national borders such as Satkhira (Tsubota 2016). Due 
to the influx of forced migrants, the proportion of Muslims in Satkhira increased from 
58.6% in 1951 to 74.0% in 1974 (Figure 1). Furthermore, the religious composition had 
changed even at the village level, since a part of the confiscated lands were leased to 
Muslims. 
Despite the substantial change in the religious composition during the chaotic 
period, the region has been relatively stable over the recent decades: the Muslims 
accounted for 78% of the total population in 1991 and 81% in 2011. However, even 
though Muslims and Hindus live next to each other, the minorities still continue to 
perceive and experience discrimination from Muslims, and are sometimes victims of 
crimes even today (Alexander et al., 2016 ). 
[Figure 1] 
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3.2. Incidence of crime 
Bangladesh is prone to crime because of ineffective law enforcement, and the crime rate 
of Sakhira was the 18th worst of the 64 districts (Faruk and Khatun, 2008). Crime 
incidences in Bangladesh have two features. First, criminals tend to commit crime 
against their peers in their community. Faruk and Khatun (2008) report that 64% of the 
crimes occurred between family members, relatives, friends, and neighbours in the same 
community, and the incidences between strangers accounted for only 22%. 
Second, although the criminals commit crime for monetary gains, the 
socio-economically vulnerable individuals, such as the poor and non-Muslims, are more 
likely to be victimised. Crimes against the poor are not necessarily counter-intuitive or 
inconsistent with Becker (1968). First, it could be too risky to commit crime against 
wealthy individuals because they are connected with the village leader and law 
enforcement authority, raising the probability of detection. Second, they may also invest 
into crime-preventing technologies such as fencing around the home. Third, as argued in 
the literature of victimology, those who are socially and geographically close to 
criminals are likely to be victimised (Cook, 1986).  
 
3.3. Cyclone Aila 
Since Satkhira District is located in a river-delta plain, it is vulnerable to floods and 
cyclones. In particular, this district was severely affected by cyclone Aila on 25 May 
2009. It was a category 1 cyclonic storm with the highest wind speed being as 100km 
per hour. The water was approximately 10-12 feet above normal height (Mallick and 
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Vogt 2012). It killed 190 and affected four million people in the country.7 
The cyclonic storm caused significant economic loss, destroying around 
300,000 acres of cropland and killing over one million livestock (Mallick and Vogt 
2012). 650,000 houses were destroyed fully or patially, causing a significant amount of 
repairment costs. Furthermore, a survey by Mallick et al. (2011) presents that 80% of 
workers lost their jobs and 40% changed their occupation. They also report the breakout 
of water-borne diseases, such as dysentery, cholera, diarrheal diseases, skin diseases and 
fever. 
In the face of these hardships, the affected people took various coping 
strategies, such as selling out own resources and changing occupation (Sultana and 
Mallick 2015). The government also provided them with Tk 3-5000 of cash and 20 kg 
of rice. However, the situation did not recover quickly, since the damaged infrastructure 
had not been reconstructed long. It appears from previous studies and my field 
interview that even two years after the cyclone attack, the land looked wasted in large 
areas (Mallick and Vogt 2012 p.224). The distribution of cash/food relief was also 
corrupted (Mahmud and Prowse 2012). Since the households with lower income have 
lower quality homes, they were affected more severely by the cyclones, and recovered 
more slowly (Mallick and Vogt 2015).  
There was an increase in robberies and violence after the cyclone (Azad and 
Khan 2015, Saha 2015). According to the field interview by the author, the stolen items 
mainly include small assets such as poultry and household utensils. As described in 
Section 4 with summary statistics, around 40% and 20% of the survey households 
experienced victimisation of property and violent crimes after the cyclone, respectively. 
                                                   
7 EM-DAT, accessed on 07 March 2017, http://www.emdat.be/disaster_list/index.html  
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4. Dataset 
I conducted a unique household survey in Satkhira District during December 2010, by 
employing the multistage stratified random sampling methodology. In the first stage, 
three upazila (sub-districts) of Kaliganj, Shamnagar, and Ashashoni were selected based 
on their economic status, the intensity of cyclone damage, and crime incidences. In the 
second stage, I randomly sampled two unions from each sub-district.8 In the next stage, 
four villages from each union and one para (cluster) from each village were selected 
randomly. In these para, the survey team created a list of all households. According to 
the list, the size of a para ranges from 27 to 189 households in the survey area and the 
average size is 67.1. This paper considers para as a unit of community. Finally, 18 
households were randomly chosen from each para based on the list. Since five 
households were unavailable for the survey, I obtained 427 of 432 sample households 
from 24 para. The total sample size and studied villages in this study is comparable or 
larger than the other quantitative and qualitative studies on Cyclone Aila, such as 
Mallick and Vogt (2012; 2014), Saha (2015), Mahmud and Prowse (2012), Sultana and 
Mallick (2015) and Mallick et al. (2011). Appendix Table A1 employs the Population 
and Housing Census 2011 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2014) to compare the 
socio-economic characteristics between the surveyed and not surveyed villages in 
Satkhira. It appears that there is no significant difference in demographics, industrial 
structure, and access to infrastructure, although a significant difference is observed in 
the material of housings. This supports the representativeness of the survey areas. 
                                                   
8 A union is an administrative unit in Bangladesh. Each union includes multiple 
villages. 
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The questionnaire consists of 13 modules: (1) the experience of post-cyclone 
crime victimisation; (2) self-reported cyclone damage; (3) evacuation behaviour; (4) 
geographical characteristics; (5) bilateral relationships among the survey households; 
(6) demographic characteristics and time allocation; (7) self-reported social capital; (8) 
asset holdings and savings; (9) disaster relief provided by the government and NGOs; 
(10) membership of microfinance institutions; (11) consumption; (12) labour and 
non-labour incomes; and (13) experience of unanticipated shocks (floods, pest, asset 
loss, and so forth). Although the survey was conducted only once in December 2010, 
the retrospective data on pre- and post-cyclone periods were collected regarding 
modules (7) to (13). 
The definition of post-disaster crime differs across studies depending on the 
context of the studies. Barsky et al. (2006) focuses on the theft of luxury goods 
unnecessary for survival, such as TV, while Siegel et al. (1999) and Zahran et al. (2009) 
cover a wider category of property crimes. The measures in this study take unity if the 
household experienced victimization of any types of property and violent crimes during 
the 18 months after the cyclone attack, respectively. 
This study employs the height of inundation at the residence as an exogenous 
determinant of cyclone damage to the residence and the other assets. Higher level of 
inundation indicates more severe asset loss and repairing costs of residence, and thus 
higher incentive to commit crime. A preferable feature of using this variable rather than 
a more direct measure, such as the value of asset loss, is the measurement accuracy. 
Although it is a self-reported variable, the survey respondents could observe the height 
accurately by checking out the eroded wall of their housing. In addition, since the mark 
of erosion on the wall remained even at the time of household survey, the enumerators 
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could also confirm the level. 
This study computes four indices of religious fractionalisation with this dataset: 
the number of religious groups in the para (Egel, 2013), an indicator of multiple 
religions, the proportion of households which does not constitute the religious majority 
of the community (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), and the index proposed by Taylor and 
Hudson (1972) to analyse the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. Therefore, this index is 
often referred to as the ELF index. This study applies this to the context of religious 
fractionalization. The ELF index is defined as 1 − ∑ ሺProportion of religion ݎሻଶ௥ , 
indicating the probability that two people randomly drawn from the population are from 
distinct religions.9 Table A2 in Online Appendix lists the religious composition and 
fractionalisation indices of the sample communities. It appears that 11 of 24 para 
consist of multiple religious groups, and the four indices are positively correlated (Table 
A3).  
Figure 2 depicts the respondents’ timing of settlement in the current community. 
It appears that most survey households settled down between the 1947 partition and the 
1971 Liberation War. This pattern is similar regardless of their religion and 
fractionalisation of community, except for the distinction that non-fractionalised Hindu 
communities have resided earlier. This is consistent with the argument in Section 3.1 
that the population of the study area is largely influenced by refugees and displaced 
individuals. 
                                                   
9 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) suggest the use of polarisation rather than 
fractionalisation indices. However, since the samples include only four religious groups, 
the polarisation index is strongly correlated with the ELF index. Therefore, this study 
cannot differentiate between the polarisation and fractionalisation effects. Hence, 
although the use of polarisation index does not change the empirical result qualitatively, 
is not reported in the paper. 
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Table 1 compares the household characteristics relative to the religious 
fractionalisation and severity of cyclone damage. Panel A shows that 30–45% and 14–
27% of the households experienced victimisation with regard to property and violent 
crimes after the cyclone, respectively. The remaining variables are used in Section 6 to 
disentangle the underlying mechanisms. They show that the households in severely 
affected and religiously fractionalised communities trust the local government less. 
Among the affected communities, those in fractionalised communities are less likely to 
receive the relief from the government. Panel B of the table presents the geographic and 
pre-cyclone socio-economic characteristics across the four columns. It appears that 
economic inequality is larger, cyclone damage is smaller, and asset holdings are higher 
in fractionalised communities. These distinctions are potentially associated with the 
victimisation risk, suggesting the importance of controlling for them in the empirical 
analysis (Fafchamps and Minten, 2006; Barslund et al., 2007; Öster and Agell, 2007; 
Fougère et al., 2009).  
[Figure 2] 
[Table 1] 
 
5. The Impact of Religious Fractionalisation on Post-Disaster Crime 
5.1. Estimation Model 
This section estimates the impact of religious fractionalisation on post-disaster crime. 
Given that the underlying mechanism of post-disaster crimes is based on the 
behavioural patterns of criminals (Section 2), it should be straightforward to investigate 
the determinants of crimes committed by the survey respondents. However, since the 
data on crime incidence generally suffer from the under-reporting bias, this study rather 
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uses the households’ experience of crime victimisation, by following Gaviria and Pagés 
(2002), Barslund et al. (2007), Gibson and Kim (2008), and Cameron and Shah (2014). 
Exploiting the fact that a large proportion of crimes occur between the peers living in 
the same community (Faruk and Khatun, 2008), my testable hypothesis is that the 
probability of victimisation is expected to be higher in the severely affected and 
religiously fractionalised communities. Section 5.2 argues the validity of the assumption 
regarding the criminals and victims residing in the same para more carefully. 
Since my dataset does not include data on pre-disaster crime victimisation, this 
study examines the cross-sectional variation of disaster damage and controls for 
potential determinants of pre-disaster victimisation. Specifically, the following single 
probit model is estimated: 
 
V௛௜ = 1ሾߚ଴ + ߚଵܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛ + ߚଶܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛×ܨݎܽܿ௛ + ߚଷܨݎܽܿ௛
+ ߚସܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁50௛ + ߚହܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁௛௜ + ܺ௛௜ߛ + ߝ௛௜ > 0ሿ 
(1)  
 
where V௛௜ takes unity if household i in para h is victimised after the cyclone, and zero 
otherwise. ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁௛௜  denotes the height of inundation (feet) at the residence of 
household i. ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛ and ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁50௛ are the 80th percentile and the median of 
ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁௛௜  in para h, respectively. These variables capture the extent of cyclone 
damage to neighbour households. ܨݎܽܿ௛  denotes the index of religious 
fractionalisation. Finally, ܺ௛௜ includes the timing of settlement, asset holdings, religion, 
demographics, geographic characteristics, and the standard deviation of the value of 
landholdings across the survey households in para h. This study employs clustered 
standard errors to address the correlation of residuals within a para. 
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The idea of controlling for ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁௛௜, ܦܽ݉ܽ݃ 80௛, and ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁50௛ is 
as follows. Assuming the damage level to household i (ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁௛௜) as constant, the 
damage to neighbour households has a positive effect on the victimisation risk of 
household i. In particular, the severity of damage to the worst affected neighbours 
(ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛) should be associated with the victimisation risk more than moderately 
affected neighbours (ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁50௛ ). Therefore, this study controls for these three 
variables and investigates the heterogeneous effect of ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛ across religious 
fractionalisation. In this estimation model, it is expected that ߚଶ > 0.  
 
5.2. Identification Strategy 
The estimation of Equation (1) relies on the following five conditions. First, the crime 
incidences or disaster damages do not enhance migration, and therefore do not affect the 
religious composition of the communities. Mallick and Vogt (2012) and Saha (2015) 
have found the increases in migration after Cyclone Aila from the severely affected 
regions, such as Samnagar and Assasuni upazila, to the urban regions, such as Satkhira 
Sadar upazila. However, I still consider that the migration was not accelerated enough to 
influence the religious composition for three reasons. First, Mallick and Vogt (2012, 
p226) claim that only male members of the household migrated, while females and 
children stayed in the village. Saha (2015) also argues the migration as a risk coping 
strategy, but the study sites include only three most severely affected villages which 
were non-randomly selected. On the contrary, this study uses the stratified random 
sampling to select 24 villages and Saha’s study sites are not included. Second, if many 
households in the severely affected areas had indeed migrated to the urban areas, the 
population growth in Samnagar and Assasuni upazila should have been slower than the 
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other upazila, and particularly Satkhira Sadar upazila should have experienced 
remarkable population growth. To test this, Appendix Table A4 reports the annual 
population growth between 2001-2011 in the first column and between 1981-2001 in 
the second column, respectively. The third column shows the difference between these 
periods. It appears that the population growth in Assasuni and Samnagar did not 
necessarily slow down from 1981-2001 to 2001-2011 compared to the other upazila. 
Satkhira Sadar did not experience the rapid population growth either. A similar pattern 
is observed when analyzing Muslims and non-Muslims separately. These findings do 
not fit the hypothesis. Finally, the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 
2010 – a nationally representative survey conducted in the next year of Cyclone Aila – 
shows that among the respondents who experienced negative shocks in 2009, such as 
disasters, only 2.42 % chose migration as a risk coping strategy (Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics 2011).  
This stability is presumably because land transactions are not frequent in rural 
Bangladesh. The main ways of obtaining land are either as an inheritance or as dowry, 
making it difficult for rural households to obtain a land from those belonging to a 
different religion or to migrate to other villages.10 In fact, Mallick et al. (2011) also 
explicitly mention that as Bangladesh is already extremely densely settled, relocation of 
coastal people in inland region is not possible. These findings suggest that the impact of 
migration on changes in the religious composition is limited. 
The second condition is conditional independency of religious fractionalisation 
and cyclone damage to the community. Although it is not well known how the residents 
                                                   
10 According to the survey by Ahmed (2005), only 11% of the rural households 
purchased land. 
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of religiously fractionalised communities were determined, I indirectly test the 
conditional independency by conducting a placebo test. Given the unavailability of data 
on pre-disaster victimisation, however, I regress four pre-disaster socio-economic status 
that are related with victimisation—household income, the size of risk-sharing network, 
trust in the local government, and general trust—on the independent variables of 
Equation (1).11 The first three of the four variables are the determinants of pre-disaster 
victimisation, while the last one is a consequence of victimisation. Cook (1986) argues 
that both poor and wealthy individuals could be targeted as victims. He also claims that 
socially isolated individuals tend to be victimised. Furthermore, the poor governance of 
the local government leads to an ineffective law enforcement authority and thus higher 
victimisation risk. Since the benefit from the local government may differ across 
socio-economic status and religions within a community, this study investigates 
household i’s trust in the local government rather than a direct indicator of governance. 
Finally, those facing higher victimisation risk should trust the others less. Thus, a 
positive or negative coefficient of interaction term in the equation of household income, 
and a negative coefficient in the equation of risk-sharing network size, trust in the local 
government, and general trust indicate the possibility of spurious correlation.  
The results of the placebo test are reported in Table 2. It appears that after 
controlling for the observed characteristics, the socio-economic status in the pre-cyclone 
period are uncorrelated with religious fractionalisation and cyclone damage, supporting 
                                                   
11 The data on risk-sharing network is obtained from the following question: how many 
households in the village could you call for help if you are in need? General trust is 
based on the subjective information elicited by the following question: generally 
speaking, would you say that; (1) most people can be trusted; (2) you can't be too 
careful; or (3) no idea. The indicator of general trust takes unity if the answer is (1) or 
(3), and zero otherwise. Trust in the local government is also elicited by a similar 
question. 
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the validity of my empirical strategy. This result is plausible in the context of Satkhira 
District. Since it is located in a river-delta plain, most communities are homogenous in 
terms of proximity to rivers (and hence the cyclone risk) and industrial structure. 
Furthermore, the path of each cyclone is randomly determined. Therefore, it is difficult 
to anticipate the severity of potential damage from Aila beforehand and choose the 
location of residence based on the risks. Regarding the conditional independency of 
religious fractionalisation, as documented in the previous sections, the religious 
composition of the study site was substantially influenced by the refugees and the 
internally displaced individuals. Presumably, such individuals who migrated to Satkhira 
during the chaotic periods could not systematically select the community in which they 
settled regardless of their socio-economic status and religion, because they were 
unfamiliar with the geographic and economic conditions of the area. 
[Table 2] 
Third, the use of fractionalisation and cyclone damage at the para level 
assumes that the criminals and victims reside in the same para. Although it is difficult to 
provide rigorous evidence to justify this assumption given the unavailability of 
information on the criminals, it could still be plausible because individuals should face 
limited mobility after the cyclone due to the severe inundation of road. In addition, 
Faruk and Khatun (2008) show that 71.8% of crime incidences in 2007 occurred in 
disaster-affected districts, and 64% of crimes were committed by peers. This suggests 
that post-disaster crimes occur between peers. However, there still is a remaining 
possibility that crimes were committed by the peers residing in the other para. This 
possibility may affect the interpretation of estimation result if the villagers in the 
religiously fractionalized and severely affected para have larger peer group outside the 
22 
 
para. In order to test this, I exploit two variables at the pre-cyclone period: size of risk 
sharing network outside the village, and self-reported trust in the residents of the other 
villages. I regress these variables on the same independent variables as Equation (1). 
Unfortunately I cannot examine the social network in the other para of the same village 
due to the data unavailability. The result is reported in Table A5. It shows that the 
network size and trust are uncorrelated or correlated in the opposite direction with the 
religious fractionalization and cyclone damages, supporting the validity of identification 
strategy. In addition to this, I also address the potential concern regarding the crime 
incidences across para in Section 5.4 by employing an alternative dataset. 
Fourth, ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛ , ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁50௛ , and ܨݎܽܿ௛ , may be subject to the 
measurement error, because they are computed based on the data from the survey 
households rather than the entire population in the community. Nevertheless, the 
sampling methodology used in this study enables us to minimise the error. The height of 
inundation at home is highly correlated with the location of the house. Similarly, 
villagers of the same religion form sub-clusters and live close to each other. Therefore, 
the measurement error could be large if the survey households are coincidentally 
selected from particular areas in the para intensively. However, I sampled the survey 
households with equally-spaced intervals in each para. 
Finally, the dataset needs to have enough variations in the religious 
fractionalisation and cyclone damage to estimate the treatment effect precisely. This 
issue may be crucial because although this study exploits the treatment variable at the 
community level, the survey was conducted in only 24 communities. However, as 
shown in Appendix Figure A1, presenting the histogram of ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80 relative to 
religious fractionalisation, we can find a variation over the damage levels in both 
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fractionalised and non-fractionalised communities. In addition, the analysis using small 
sample data could be sensitive to outliers, but Appendix Figure 2—depicting the 
correlation among ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80, religious fractionalisation, and victimisation rate at the 
community level—shows that the data do not contain outliers. This study also addresses 
this concern by conducting various robustness checks, including the analysis using an 
alternative district-level dataset. 
 
5.3. Benchmark Result 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of Equation (1). The table shows different 
patterns between property and violent crimes. With regard to the property crime, the 
fractionalised communities without the disaster shock or the non-fractionalised 
communities experiencing a shock do not suffer from high crime incidence.12 The 
crime incidence is significantly high only in the fractionalised and disaster-affected 
communities. Column 2 indicates that the impact of a one-foot increase in the height of 
inundation on increasing the victimisation risk is larger by 5.6 percentage point in the 
fractionalised communities. On the other hand, victimisation related to violent crime is 
weakly exacerbated by disaster shocks or religious fractionalisation on average. 
Furthermore, after controlling for the fractionalisation variables, one’s religion does not 
predict the patterns of his/her victimisation risks. 
Intriguingly, the level of cyclone damage to the household or asset holdings do 
not predict the propensity to be a victim. Although educated households are more likely 
to be victims of property crimes, the land holdings are not associated with victimisation, 
                                                   
12 The coefficients of Damage80 are counter-intuitively negative, although statistically 
insignificant. However, the signs vary across specifications, as shown in Section 5.5. 
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and the coefficient of the value of grain storage is rather negative. Related with this, the 
victims of property crimes are fewer in para with higher asset inequality. Although 
these findings are different from the prediction of Becker (1968), they are in fact 
consistent with the statistics of Faruk and Khatun (2008) and argument in Section 3: 
those who are geographically and socio-economically close to potential criminals and 
those who cannot call for help to law enforcement authorities are more likely to be 
victimised. Consequently, the wealthy households are not necessarily targeted as victims 
of crime in rural Bangladesh. This study analyses this point more carefully in Section 
5.6. With regard to the other control variables, the households living close to paved 
roads are more likely to be victims.  
[Table 3] 
 
5.4. Evidence from District-Level Data 
A potential concern regarding the use of survey data is the small sample size of the 
community-level variables. In particular, the data may not show sufficient variations of 
the cyclone damage and religious fractionalisation, given that the sample communities 
were selected only from one district. Another issue is that the validity of the estimation 
model relies on the assumption that the criminal and victim reside in the same 
community.  
In order to address these issues, this section employs an alternative dataset at 
the district level. Since the administrative data on crime rate usually face the problem of 
under-reporting, I use the data collected by Faruk and Khatun (2008). They surveyed 
164,526 crime incidences that occurred in all Bangladeshi districts in the year 2007, 
25 
 
based on police reports and four major daily newspapers.13 Although there may exist 
some petty crimes that were not reported on the newspapers, I still believe that this is 
the most reliable statistics available. In 2007, when the data were collected, 39 of 64 
districts were affected by a nation-wide flood since July until September. Hence, this 
study combines these data to test whether the crime rate was higher in the flood-affected 
and religiously fractionalised districts. Specifically, this study estimates the following 
OLS model: 
 
ܥݎ݅݉݁ௗ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܨ݈݋݋݀ௗ + ߚଶܨ݈݋݋݀ௗ×ܨݎܽܿௗ + ߚଷܨݎܽܿௗ
+ ߚସܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ௗ + ߝௗ 
(2) 
 
where ܥݎ݅݉݁ௗ denotes the number of crime incidences per 100,000 people in district d. 
ܨ݈݋݋݀ௗ  and ܨݎܽܿௗ  represent the proportion of flood-affected areas (or affected 
population) and the religious fractionalisation index in district d, respectively. Finally, 
ܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ௗ  denotes the total population of the district. The data on religious 
composition and population are collected from the 2001 population census (Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics, 2007), and those on flood damages are obtained from the Disaster 
Management Bureau (2007, pp.7). Table 4 presents the result. The coefficients of the 
interaction term are positive and significant for three of the four specifications, 
consistent with the result of Table 3. 
[Table 4] 
                                                   
13 This crime statistics includes eight types of crime: property crime (34.0%), organised 
crime (22.7%), hate crime (16.0%), violent crime (15.0%), innocent victimisation 
(11.0%), victimless crime (1.0%), public order crime (0.3%), and political crime 
(0.04%). 
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5.5. Further Robustness Checks 
The first potential issue in the benchmark result is that the religious fractionalisation 
indices could be correlated with the proportion of non-Muslims in the community. 
Given the argument that non-Muslims tend to be victimised, the estimated coefficients 
of religious fractionalisation may simply capture the existence of non-Muslims. In order 
to test this, I additionally control for the proportion of non-Muslims and its interaction 
with ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛ . The result is presented in Table A6 in Online Appendix. The 
estimated effect of fractionalisation is still significant and the proportion of 
non-Muslims does not predict the patterns of victimisation risks. 
 Second, religious fractionalisation is weakly but positively correlated with the 
community size (Table A2).14 The coefficient of religious fractionalisation in Table 3 
may capture the impact of community size. Thus, I additionally control for the 
community size and its interaction with ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80. The result in Table A7 still 
presents the statistically significant impact of religious fractionalisation.  
 Third, the fractionalisation index may also be correlated with the distance to 
the India-Bangladesh border. The communities close to the border may be prone to 
crime because of smugglers and brokers of human trafficking. In my dataset, eight of 24 
communities are located relatively close to the border. Therefore, I additionally control 
for the interaction between ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛ and the indicator for the eight communities. 
The result does not change qualitatively (Table A8). 
 Fourth, given the unavailability of pre-disaster victimization data, I also 
                                                   
14 The community size is significantly correlated with the number of religious groups 
(ρ=0.36, p-value=0.087), but not with the other three fractionalisation indices. 
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estimate Equation (1) with additionally controlling for four pre-cyclone variables which 
are used as dependent variables in the placebo test. Although these variables could be 
endogenous, it is still informative to know to what extent the estimation result changes 
in the alternative specification. The result is presented in Table A9 and does not change 
qualitatively.  
 Fifth, I also examine the relative importance of omitted variable bias driven by 
unobserved geographic characteristics and cyclone damage. Specifically, I estimate 
Equation (1) without controlling for height of inundation at home, duration of 
inundation on the paved road, a dummy if road to cyclone shelter is available, distance 
between home and local government office, and distance between home and paved road. 
The result is presented in Table A10. The coefficient of interest in this specification is 
smaller than the benchmark result. This implies that the estimated treatment effect 
would be even larger than that shown in Table 3 if the unobserved characteristics were 
fully controlled for. 
Sixth, if the religious fractionalisation and cyclone damage increase the 
post-disaster crime and this has a negative impact on the social capital of the community, 
we may observe lower social capital in the severely affected and religiously 
fractionalised communities. Therefore, I also examine the impact on general trust in the 
post-disaster period. Again, I find supporting evidence (Table A11). 
Seventh, in the benchmark estimation, the cyclone damage at the para level is 
characterised by the 80th percentile (Damage80) and median height (Damage50) of 
inundation at home. I also estimate the model that uses the mean height of inundation. 
The result is reported in Table A12, and is shown to be robust. 
Finally, the small sample size of the survey communities makes the estimation 
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results sensitive to the outlier in the community-level variables. In order to address this 
issue, this study estimates Equation (1) by using OLS, which is less sensitive to the 
outlier than the probit model. In addition, this study analyses the interaction of binary 
treatment variables, namely the indicator of fractionalised community and a dummy 
variable indicating whether ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛ is higher than the sample median (two feet). 
The results are reported in Table A13, and they do not differ from the benchmark 
specification qualitatively. 
 
5.6. Who is Victimised in Fractionalised Communities? 
So far, it has not been uncovered as to who is particularly victimised in the religiously 
fractionalised and severely affected communities. The victimisation risk could vary 
across religions and wealth. The historical background presented in Section 3 predicts 
that non-Muslims could be more likely to be victimized than Muslims. Wealthy 
households may face higher risk of victimization, given higher material payoff for the 
criminals in case of succeeding in the theft (Becker 1968). On the contrary, poor 
households cannot invest in the crime prevention technology, or do not have social 
network with the village authorities, such as the leader and police. This, in turn, 
increases the probability of succeeding in the theft, aggravating the victimization risk 
(Cook 1986). Thus, the impact of wealth is an empirical question. Therefore, this 
section compares the estimation results of Equation (1) between the subsamples of 
Muslims and non-Muslims (Table 5), and between landed and landless households 
(Table 6).  
 It is demonstrated from Tables 5 and 6 that the socio-economically vulnerable 
households, such as non-Muslims and landless households, are more likely to be 
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victimised. While the impact on the property crime is comparable between the Muslims 
and non-Muslims in fractionalised and cyclone-affected communities, the Muslims in 
such communities tend to be targets of violent crime as well. For the landed households, 
the impact on property crime becomes insignificant for all specifications, but the impact 
for landless households remains large and statistically significant.  
 Why do the criminals not target landed households, even though the material 
payoff from stealing is higher? There are two potential explanations. First, landed 
households are connected with village leaders and police, and therefore, it is too risky to 
steal their properties. Second, they invest more to protect their properties, and therefore, 
the probability of succeeding in the crime is too low. My data fit the first explanation; 
land holding is positively and significantly correlated with the indicator of knowing the 
village leader personally (ρ=0.13, p-value=0.007). On the other hand, it is uncorrelated 
with the investment into crime prevention technology.15 
[Table 5] 
[Table 6] 
 
6. Underlying Mechanisms of Post-Disaster Crime 
This section disentangles four channels through which religious fractionalisation 
triggers the post-disaster crime.  
 
6.1. Misallocation of disaster reliefs 
                                                   
15 The survey households are considered to be connected with the village leader if they 
self-report that the relationship with the leader is relative, friend or neighbour. The 
investment into crime prevention technology is captured by three indicators, such as 
locking the door of residence (ρ=0.02, p-value=0.679) and livestock hut (ρ=-0.07, 
p-value=0.307), and watching livestock when feeding them (ρ=0.033, p-value=0.635).  
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In the context of Bangladesh, the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) programme 
provides disaster-affected households with food. The survey data show that 40% of the 
households received the relief after the cyclone and the average amount is 
approximately Tk 2,100 which is equivalent to three weeks’ worth of income in the 
study area. The beneficiaries of the relief programme are selected by the local 
committee members based on the severity of damage, income, land holding, gender of 
household head, and so forth. It may be the case that disasters make the local 
governance of the communities with religiously fractionalised committee members less 
effective than those with non-fractionalised members, and hence, the former may not be 
able to choose the relief beneficiaries properly. 
The explanatory power of this channel is examined by conducting the 
following three tests: 1) whether the cyclone damage aggravates the local governance 
particularly in the religiously fractionalised communities; 2) whether the 
cyclone-affected households in religiously fractionalised communities are less likely to 
receive the disaster relief than those in non-fractionalised communities; and finally 3) 
whether the victimisation risk in fractionalised communities is particularly higher if a 
larger proportion of community members are severely affected by the cyclone but do 
not receive the relief.  
First, I approximate the local governance by using the indicator of trust in the 
local government. I regress the first difference of this indicator before and after the 
cyclone on the control variables of Equation (1) with the ordered probit model.16 
Regarding the second test, I estimate the following probit model to investigate 
                                                   
16 Note that the trust in the local government in the pre-cyclone period is shown to be 
uncorrelated with fractionalisation or cyclone damage (Table 2). 
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the effect of inundation at home (ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁௛௜) on the propensity for the household to 
receive disaster relief from the government, and how the effect differs between 
fractionalised and non-fractionalised communities: 
 
ܴ݈݁݅݁ ௛݂௜ = 1ሾߚ଴ + ߚଵܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁௛௜ + ߚଶܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁௛௜×ܨݎܽܿ௛ + ߚଷܨݎܽܿ௛
+ ߚସܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛௜ + ߚହܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁50௛௜ + ܺ௛௜ߛ + ߝ௛௜ > 0ሿ 
(3) 
 
where ܴ݈݁݅݁ ௛݂௜  takes unity if household i in para h received relief from the 
government after the disaster, and zero otherwise. The height of inundation at home 
captures the eligibility for the household to receive the relief, and therefore, I test to 
what extent fractionalisation influences the propensity to receive the relief, given the 
equal level of eligibility. The smaller effect of inundation on the probability of receiving 
the relief in fractionalised than non-fractionalised communities is consistent with the 
hypothesis; i.e., ߚଵ > 0 and ߚଶ < 0. 
Finally, in order to investigate whether the victimisation risk is indeed higher in 
the communities with severe misallocation of disaster relief, I compute the proportion of 
households in the community except household i, which are inundated more than the 
sample median (two feet) but did not receive the relief from the government, ܲݎ݋݌௛௜. 
Then, I additionally control for the proportion interacted with ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛×ܨݎܽܿ௛ in 
Equation (1) as follows: 
 
V௛௜ = 1ሾߚ଴ + ߚଵܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛ + ሺߚଶ଴ + ߚଶଵܲݎ݋݌௛௜ሻ×ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁80௛×ܨݎܽܿ௛
+ ߚଷܨݎܽܿ௛ + ߚସܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁50௛ + ߚହܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁௛௜ + ܺ௛௜ߛ + ߝ௛௜ > 0ሿ 
(4) 
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If the crimes in the fractionalised communities are committed by the severely affected 
but uninsured individuals, we should observe ߚଶ଴ = 0 and ߚଶଵ > 0. Although the 
proportion of affected and uninsured households is admittedly non-random, it is still 
insightful to show the correlation as suggestive evidence. 
 Tables 7–9 present the results. Overall, the results are consistent with the 
hypothesis, although the result in Table 7 is relatively unstable. In Table 7, the 
coefficients of interaction terms are negative for all specifications as expected, but the 
first and third columns are statistically insignificant. Regarding Table 8, the coefficients 
of inundation at home are significantly positive and the interaction terms are 
significantly negative for all specifications, supporting the hypothesis. Column 2 shows 
that while a one-foot increase in the inundation level significantly raises the propensity 
to receive government relief by 13.3 percentage point in the non-fractionalised 
communities, the corresponding figure for the fractionalised communities is -3.7 
percentage point (0.133–0.170). The latter figure is statistically insignificantly different 
from zero. In addition, the coefficients of fractionalisation, ߚଷ, are positive, implying a 
higher incidence of inclusion errors in the fractionalised communities. Non-inundated 
households in the fractionalised communities are 24.5 percentage point more likely to 
receive the relief than those in the non-fractionalised communities (Column 2). 
Furthermore, I also conduct the same estimation models using the subsamples of 
Muslims, non-Muslims, landed households, and landless households, and obtain 
qualitatively comparable results for all specifications; the cyclone-affected households 
in the fractionalised communities are excluded from the relief beneficiaries regardless 
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of their religion and wealth.17 Finally, Table 9 also supports the hypothesis. It appears 
that high victimisation risk in the fractionalised and severely affected communities is 
observed only when the proportion of affected but uninsured neighbour households is 
large.  
[Table 7] 
[Table 8] 
[Table 9] 
 
6.2. Inefficient Risk sharing 
The frequent post-disaster crime in the fractionalised communities can also be driven by 
the inefficient risk-sharing arrangement. This study tests this channel by estimating a 
similar model to Equation (3). Here, the dependent variables are binary variables that 
indicate the receipt of informal assistance from neighbours, such as gifts and loans 
without interest. If the risk-sharing arrangement is inefficient and cannot pool the 
idiosyncratic shock in the fractionalised communities, we should observe ߚଵ > 0 and 
ߚଶ < 0. The results in Table 10, however, suggest that this channel is not likely to 
explain the high victimisation risk in fractionalised and severely affected communities.  
[Table 10] 
 
6.3. Increasing Income Inequality 
The cyclone could have enlarged income inequality, particularly in the fractionalised 
communities, and this could be the driver of high victimisation risk in such 
                                                   
17 The results are not reported in the paper, but are available from the corresponding 
author upon request. 
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communities. However, the data suggest that this is not likely. Before the cyclone, the 
standard deviation of monthly household income is larger in fractionalised communities 
(avg. = 3.43) than in non-fractionalised communities (avg. = 2.90). After the cyclone, 
however, it rather decreases in both communities and is smaller in the fractionalised 
communities (1.19 in non-fractionalised communities and 1.07 in fractionalised 
communities). The comparison based on the coefficient of variation does not differ 
qualitatively. This is inconsistent with the underlying assumption. 
 
6.4. Political Tension 
Finally, the channel through the increased political tension cannot fully explain the 
observed patterns of victimisation risk either. First, the riots for political purpose are 
often accompanied by violent attacks; however, as shown in Table 3, fractionalisation 
triggers only property crimes. Second, if some political tension exists before the cyclone, 
households in the fractionalised communities should exhibit lower trust in the local 
government in the pre-disaster period. The result from Table 2 is, however, counter to 
the prediction. Third, if the post-disaster crimes are driven by political tension, the 
landed households who are connected with the village leaders should be victimised. 
However, it is found that rather the landless are victimised (Table 6). Finally, this survey 
includes the question regarding the time allocation for political activities. It appears that 
less than 5% of the households spent time for political activities during 2009–2010, and 
it is correlated with neither the fractionalisation index, crime victimisation, or religion.18  
 
                                                   
18 The statistics are not reported in the paper, but are available from the corresponding 
author upon request. 
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7. Conclusions 
Using household-level and district-level datasets of Bangladesh, I showed that religious 
fractionalisation significantly aggravates the victimisation risk of post-disaster crime. In 
particular, the non-Muslims and landless households in the fractionalised communities 
are more likely to be victimised. Further analyses provide supporting evidence that the 
high victimisation risk is driven by poor targeting accuracy of disaster relief 
programmes; severely affected but uninsured households commit crime to smooth their 
consumption.  
In allocating the disaster relief to the affected individuals accurately, good 
governance is essential (Coady et al., 2004). Many researchers have claimed that good 
governance mitigates human loss (Kahn, 2005; Meng et al., 2015), reduces poverty 
(Fafchamps, 2003), and facilitates socio-ecological resilience (Adger et al., 2005) 
during and after disasters. In addition to these, this study suggests the importance of 
local governance in controlling the post-disaster crimes.  
Two policy implications can be derived from these arguments. First, in 
fractionalised communities, the disaster relief programmes based on self-selection 
targeting such as Food/Cash For Work may be recommended, since the targeting 
accuracy of these programmes is less likely to be affected by the local governance. 
Second, since the affected households commit crime to smooth consumption, 
development of formal insurance institutions for covariate disaster shock could be 
helpful to control crime. However, these suggestions must be interpreted with caution, 
since they hinge on the validity of my identification strategy and the small sample 
dataset. 
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Note: the 1974 census does not report the religious composition of Satkhira district. 
Figure 1: Religious Composition of Satkhira District: 1951–2011 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution Function of Year of Settlement 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Relative to Religious Fractionalisation and Cyclone Damage 
Multiple religious groups in the para? Yes No 
At least 20% of residences were inundated? Yes (1) 
No 
(2) 
Yes 
(3) 
No 
(4) 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  
Panel A: Dependent Variables            
1 if victim of property crime after the cyclone 0.45  0.44   0.30  *** 0.44   
1 if victim of violence crime after the cyclone 0.27  0.26   0.14  *** 0.17   
1 if trust the local government after the cyclone 0.75  0.98  *** 0.89  *** 0.81   
1 if recipient of disaster relief 0.27  0.26   0.60  *** 0.17   
  The amount of relief if recipient (Tk) 1521 3473 1660 2766 --- 2496 2428 --- 1416 2018 --- 
1 if recipient of interest-free informal loans 0.11  0.13   0.13   0.09   
  The amount of loans if recipient (Tk) 782 3623 107 401 --- 679 2063 --- 2222 6666 --- 
1 if recipient of gift/remittance 0.08  0.04   0.05   0.02   
  The amount of gift/remittance if recipient (Tk) 442 2267 0.00 0.00 --- 339 1929 --- 0.00 0.00 --- 
            
Panel B: Independent Variables            
Cyclone Damages            
Height of inundation at home (ft) 1.72 1.74 0.06 0.30 *** 2.84 1.30 *** 0.19 0.62 *** 
Duration of inundation on the paved road 
(month) 0.38 1.01 0.00 0.00 *** 0.60 1.75  0.08 0.25 ** 
1 if road to cyclone shelter is available 0.43  0.44   0.29  *** 0.59  ** 
            
Geographic Characteristics            
Distance between home and local government 
office (km) 2.61 1.80 2.72 1.89  3.65 3.16 *** 1.94 1.06 ** 
Distance between home and paved road (km) 0.55 0.71 0.39 0.29  0.75 1.23 * 0.27 0.60 ** 
            
Demographics            
Household size 4.10 1.46 4.37 1.74  4.46 1.62 ** 4.20 1.35  
Proportion of males aged 15 or over 0.38 0.19 0.36 0.19  0.35 0.16  0.36 0.15  
Age of head 43.67 13.20 46.54 12.94  44.22 13.29  41.39 12.92  
Schooling years of head 4.67 3.99 4.70 3.66  4.16 3.67  3.96 3.77  
Female head 0.06  0.07   0.03   0.06   
            
Socio-Economic Characteristics            
Muslim 0.32  0.43   0.69  *** 1.00  *** 
Hindu 0.55  0.57   0.31  *** 0.00  *** 
Christian 0.01  0.00   0.00   0.00   
Buddhist 0.12  0.00  *** 0.00  *** 0.00  *** 
Year of settlement in the current residence 1970 21.33 1963 23.33 ** 1968 22.57  1971 19.73  
Standard deviation of land assets within para 
(106 Tk) 0.27 0.23 0.46 0.30 *** 0.12 0.14 *** 0.36 0.27 ** 
Value of land assets (106 Tk) 0.19 0.38 0.23 0.55  0.07 0.20 *** 0.11 0.44  
Value of livestock assets (Tk3) 13.91 52.85 15.61 18.53  4.03 9.88 ** 8.82 30.11  
Value of grain stock assets (Tk3) 1.12 3.24 1.72 3.98  0.21 0.97 *** 1.08 3.00  
Value of deposit (Tk3) 4.61 18.93 6.27 16.21  2.80 6.78  2.32 4.79  
1 if own cell phone 0.31  0.48  ** 0.36   0.15  ** 
Obs. (Households/Communities) 142/8 54/3  177/10  54/3  
The mean difference from Column (1) is reported. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. --- not tested. 
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Table 2: Placebo Test  
  Pre-Cyclone Household Income Pre-Cyclone Risk Sharing Network 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.195 -0.014 -0.057 0.018 -0.749 0.091 0.297 -0.206 
(0.287) (0.251) (0.293) (0.271) (0.918) (0.694) (0.667) (0.687) 
  × Number of religions in the para 0.181    0.542    
(0.109)    (0.322)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  0.163    0.469   
 (0.148)    (0.401)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   1.853    2.237  
  (1.639)    (4.760)  
  ×ELF index    0.534    2.871 
   (0.707)    (1.813) 
Number of religions in the para -0.591*    0.090    
(0.317)    (1.217)    
1 if multiple religions  -0.505    -0.690   
 (0.404)    (1.309)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -4.321    -5.708  
  (2.874)    (7.002)  
ELF index    -1.915    -3.017 
   (1.396)    (3.961) 
Median height of inundation -0.369* -0.348 -0.341 -0.404* 0.374 -0.035 -0.265 0.274 
 (0.214) (0.221) (0.245) (0.212) (0.991) (0.938) (0.950) (0.971) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2: Continued  
  Pre-Cyclone Trust in Local Government Pre-Cyclone General Trust 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.031 -0.039 -0.025 -0.041 0.016 0.039* 0.034 0.030 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) 
  × Number of religions in the para -0.010    0.025 
(0.020)    (0.020) 
  ×1 if multiple religions  -0.017   0.031 
 (0.021)   (0.020) 
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -0.287  0.086 
  (0.206)  (0.179) 
  ×ELF index    -0.068 0.088 
   (0.098) (0.073) 
Number of religions in the para 0.069    -0.020 
(0.051)    (0.054) 
1 if multiple religions  0.087   -0.028 
 (0.063)   (0.065) 
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   0.686*  0.215 
  (0.416)  (0.333) 
ELF index    0.318 0.090 
   (0.223) (0.152) 
Median height of inundation 0.056 0.056 0.048 0.063 -0.005 -0.005 0.021 0.019 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.046) (0.042) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 406 406 406 406 
The marginal effects at the mean are reported. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
 
45 
 
Table 3: The Impact of Religious Fractionalisation on Post-Disaster Crime Victimisation 
  Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.079 -0.049 -0.045 -0.045 -0.085 -0.063 -0.055 -0.059 
(0.055) (0.042) (0.046) (0.046) (0.063) (0.050) (0.050) (0.046) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.043**    0.023    
(0.022)    (0.030)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  0.056***    0.025   
 (0.019)    (0.035)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   0.418**    0.488  
  (0.204)    (0.306)  
  ×ELF index    0.238**    0.235* 
   (0.103)    (0.132) 
Number of religions in the para -0.030    0.048    
(0.060)    (0.099)    
1 if multiple religions  0.003    0.086   
 (0.059)    (0.120)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -0.496    -1.043*  
  (0.309)    (0.582)  
ELF index    -0.283    -0.468 
   (0.177)    (0.320) 
Median height of inundation -0.042 -0.026 -0.029 -0.037 0.010 0.017 -0.027 -0.020 
(0.051) (0.044) (0.051) (0.051) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.059) 
Height of inundation at home 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.012 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Log (Year of settlement) 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.021 0.020 0.015 0.016 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) 
Duration of inundation on the paved road  -0.036 -0.033 -0.038 -0.036 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.008 
(month) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
1 if road to cyclone shelter is available -0.071 -0.073 -0.072 -0.072 -0.171** -0.172** -0.175** -0.174** 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) 
Distance between home and local government  0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.006 
office (km) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Distance between home and paved road (km) -0.057* -0.058* -0.054 -0.059* -0.035 -0.037 -0.038 -0.041 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
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Household size -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Proportion of males aged 15 or over 0.033 0.029 0.019 0.031 -0.092 -0.100 -0.086 -0.084 
(0.134) (0.133) (0.133) (0.134) (0.122) (0.119) (0.122) (0.130) 
Age of head 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age squared (×103) -0.018 -0.017 -0.019 -0.015 0.026 0.023 0.017 0.020 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.083) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) 
Schooling years of head 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Female head 0.075 0.077 0.061 0.067 -0.092 -0.100 -0.109 -0.106 
(0.110) (0.110) (0.113) (0.112) (0.081) (0.079) (0.082) (0.082) 
Hindu -0.035 -0.057 -0.009 -0.014 0.028 0.013 0.091** 0.083* 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.057) (0.061) (0.046) (0.048) 
Buddhist/Christian -0.159 -0.068 0.015 0.008 -0.037 0.068 0.122 0.139 
(0.143) (0.080) (0.076) (0.078) (0.150) (0.112) (0.107) (0.100) 
S.D. of land assets (×106) -0.182* -0.207** -0.198** -0.217** -0.090 -0.118 -0.123 -0.117 
(0.101) (0.104) (0.101) (0.104) (0.178) (0.176) (0.183) (0.178) 
Value of land assets (106 Tk) -0.047 -0.051 -0.038 -0.041 -0.071 -0.071 -0.055 -0.055 
(0.093) (0.095) (0.093) (0.093) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) 
Value of livestock assets (103 Tk) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Value of grain stock assets (103 Tk) -0.015** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Value of deposit (103 Tk) 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
1 if own cell phone -0.022 -0.020 -0.026 -0.023 -0.082 -0.081 -0.070 -0.070 
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.070) (0.071) (0.069) (0.070) 
Constant 0.026 0.001 0.027 0.042 -0.094 -0.033 0.067 0.059 
(0.322) (0.294) (0.305) (0.303) (0.292) (0.261) (0.264) (0.267) 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: District-Level Analysis 
  Crime Rate in 2007 (per 100,000) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proportion of flood affected population -1.303* -1.452*   
(0.669) (0.772)   
  ×1 – (proportion of religious majority in the district) 8.836**    
(4.125)    
  ×ELF index  5.917*   
 (3.195)   
Proportion of flood affected area   -0.550 -0.652 
   (0.453) (0.517) 
   ×1 – (proportion of religious majority in the district)   4.494*  
   (2.507)  
   ×ELF index    3.229 
    (2.107) 
1 – (proportion of religious majority in the district) -2.642  9.570  
(63.973)  (63.886)  
ELF index  -4.719  6.809 
 (62.176)  (61.574) 
Population (× 106) 7.892 7.818 8.177 8.165 
(7.743) (7.585) (7.567) (7.433) 
Constant 173.632*** 174.521*** 168.036*** 167.858*** 
(29.683) (31.629) (29.422) (31.294) 
Observations 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.048 0.047 0.035 0.035 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects between Muslims and Non-Muslims 
 Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
Muslim Households (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.139* -0.052 -0.061 -0.047 -0.017 -0.094** -0.071* -0.077* 
(0.071) (0.060) (0.059) (0.055) (0.082) (0.043) (0.041) (0.039) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.100**    -0.070    
(0.045)    (0.058)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  0.115**    -0.057   
 (0.053)    (0.065)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   0.865***    -0.288  
  (0.287)    (0.334)  
  ×ELF index    0.462***    -0.149 
   (0.166)    (0.189) 
Number of religions in the para -0.131    0.204*    
(0.091)    (0.105)    
1 if multiple religions  -0.115    0.212**   
 (0.095)    (0.105)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -1.246**    0.585  
  (0.554)    (0.634)  
ELF index    -0.674**    0.352 
   (0.300)    (0.354) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 
 Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
Non-Muslim Households (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.460*** -0.714*** -0.140** -0.375*** -0.109 -0.704*** -0.267*** -0.408*** 
(0.171) (0.159) (0.070) (0.135) (0.162) (0.229) (0.047) (0.083) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.192**    0.067    
(0.079)    (0.063)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  0.629***    0.715***   
 (0.116)    (0.221)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   0.733**    2.276***  
  (0.339)    (0.418)  
  ×ELF index    1.071***    1.554*** 
   (0.415)    (0.293) 
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Number of religions in the para -0.452**    -0.085    
(0.181)    (0.190)    
1 if multiple religions  -1.724***    -2.113***   
 (0.358)    (0.661)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -0.825    -5.107***  
  (0.890)    (0.921)  
ELF index    -2.108**    -3.809*** 
   (0.987)    (0.772) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects between Landless and Landed Households 
 Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
Landless Households (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.038 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.024 0.053 0.030 
(0.060) (0.057) (0.056) (0.054) (0.057) (0.043) (0.040) (0.042) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.046**    0.011    
(0.022)    (0.025)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  0.065**    0.001   
 (0.025)    (0.032)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   0.602***    0.142  
  (0.218)    (0.323)  
  ×ELF index    0.305***    0.126 
   (0.103)    (0.130) 
Number of religions in the para -0.116**    0.009    
(0.050)    (0.073)    
1 if multiple religions  -0.151**    0.005   
 (0.062)    (0.111)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -1.297***    -0.773  
  (0.366)    (0.598)  
ELF index    -0.726***    -0.411 
   (0.185)    (0.311) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 
 Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
Landed Households (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.030 -0.040 -0.066 -0.058 -0.208** -0.154** -0.236*** -0.220*** 
(0.078) (0.049) (0.055) (0.055) (0.081) (0.071) (0.065) (0.077) 
  ×Number of religions in the para -0.012    0.052    
(0.043)    (0.035)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  -0.018    0.049   
 (0.040)    (0.035)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   0.067    1.132***  
  (0.313)    (0.331)  
  ×ELF index    0.013    0.516*** 
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   (0.178)    (0.174) 
Number of religions in the para 0.191    0.116    
(0.130)    (0.114)    
1 if multiple religions  0.262**    0.150   
 (0.115)    (0.124)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   0.628    -1.387**  
  (0.509)    (0.622)  
ELF index    0.448    -0.608 
   (0.318)    (0.401) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table 7: Fractionalisation and Disaster Effects on Changes in Trust in the Local Government 
  ∆Trust in Local Government 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.166 -0.372** -0.354* -0.322* 
(0.209) (0.147) (0.181) (0.165) 
  × Number of religions in the para -0.165    
(0.102)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  -0.195**   
 (0.099)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -1.104  
  (1.044)  
  ×ELF index    -0.670* 
   (0.395) 
Number of religions in the para 0.445    
(0.365)    
1 if multiple religions  0.735**   
 (0.353)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   2.870  
  (2.155)  
ELF index    1.626 
   (1.131) 
Median height of inundation 0.364** 0.444** 0.387* 0.358* 
 (0.178) (0.173) (0.203) (0.183) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 
The dependent variable is the first difference of the indicator of trust in the local government.  
The coefficients of ordered probit model are reported. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table 8: Fractionalisation and Disaster Effects on the Misallocation of Disaster Relief 
  Disaster Relief from the Government 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Height of inundation at home 0.179*** 0.133*** 0.085*** 0.111*** 
(0.065) (0.036) (0.029) (0.030) 
  ×Number of religions in the para -0.080* 
(0.045) 
  ×1 if multiple religions -0.170*** 
(0.049) 
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para) -0.457*** 
(0.141) 
  ×ELF index -0.450*** 
(0.167) 
Number of religions in the para 0.120 
(0.079) 
1 if multiple religions 0.245*** 
(0.077) 
1 – (proportion of majority in the para) 0.964** 
(0.440) 
ELF index 0.638*** 
(0.243) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.085 -0.081 -0.103 -0.081 
 (0.075) (0.068) (0.082) (0.073) 
Median height of inundation 0.156* 0.149* 0.191* 0.151* 
 (0.081) (0.080) (0.098) (0.089) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table 9: The Proportion of Uninsured Neighbors and Post-Disaster Crime Victimisation 
 Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.026 -0.040 -0.035 -0.028 -0.060 -0.066 -0.047 -0.057 
(0.055) (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) (0.068) (0.052) (0.049) (0.050) 
  ×Number of religions in the para -0.023    -0.005    
(0.030)    (0.042)    
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.066**    0.029    
  ×Proportion of affected but uninsured households (0.027)    (0.022)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  0.028    0.032   
 (0.042)    (0.077)   
  ×1 if multiple religions  0.037    -0.010   
  ×Proportion of affected but uninsured households  (0.049)    (0.072)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -0.235    0.099  
  (0.296)    (0.391)  
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   1.522**    0.872  
  ×Proportion of affected but uninsured households   (0.614)    (0.624)  
  ×ELF index    -0.014    0.211 
   (0.175)    (0.249) 
  ×ELF index    0.394*    0.037 
  ×Proportion of affected but uninsured households    (0.227)    (0.240) 
Number of religions in the para 0.043    0.080    
(0.059)    (0.104)    
1 if multiple religions  0.014    0.083   
 (0.061)    (0.128)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -0.185    -0.835  
  (0.316)    (0.609)  
ELF index    -0.123    -0.452 
   (0.187)    (0.362) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table 10: The Impact of Fractionalisation on the Efficiency of Risk Sharing 
  Informal Loans without Interest Gift/Remittance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Height of inundation at home 0.047 0.014 0.005 0.009 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
(0.035) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
  ×Number of religions in the para -0.032 -0.005 
(0.024) (0.006) 
  ×1 if multiple religions -0.039 -0.008 
(0.031) (0.007) 
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para) -0.091 -0.036 
(0.130) (0.029) 
  ×ELF index -0.088 -0.032 
(0.100) (0.025) 
Number of religions in the para 0.053 0.026* 
(0.051) (0.014) 
1 if multiple religions 0.040 0.031 
(0.067) (0.019) 
1 – (proportion of majority in the para) 0.281 0.116 
(0.252) (0.080) 
ELF index 0.243 0.084 
(0.175) (0.053) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.008 -0.002 -0.015 -0.015 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Median height of inundation -0.023 -0.030 -0.004 -0.005 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.008 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.038) (0.034) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 406 406 406 406 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Online Appendix 
 
 
Figure A1: Cyclone Damage and Religious Fractionalisation across Communities 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Correlation among the Height of Inundation, Religious Fractionalisation, and the 
Victimisation Rate at the Community Level 
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Table A1: Socio-Economic Characteristics of Surveyed and Not Surveyed Villages 
 Not Surveyed Surveyed   Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Difference 
The number of households 299.47 310.85 271.43 173.99  Household size 4.23 0.37 4.23 0.33  Literacy rate 50.62 11.67 46.33 12.20  Proportion of the employed (age>6) 0.36 0.09 0.36 0.07  Agriculture 0.83 0.24 0.82 0.23  Industry 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.05  Service 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.21  Proportion of the household work (age>6) 0.46 0.10 0.46 0.09  % Pucca (high quality material) house 12.12 10.07 8.61 7.83 ** 
% access to sanitary toilet 60.62 31.80 66.98 26.00  % access to tap water 4.29 16.67 5.07 12.02  % access to electricity 33.30 20.89 29.93 19.32  
N 1,177  24   
Source: Computed from Population and Housing Census 2011. The villages in Satkhira Sadar Upazila are not included, since they are located in the urban 
areas and therefore not appropriate for the comparison group. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
  
58 
 
 
Table A2: Religious Fractionalization in the Sample Communities 
Para ID Number of households 
Proportion of Number of 
religions 1 – (% of majority) 
ELF 
Index 
Year of settlement 
Muslim Hindu Christian Buddhism Mean S.D. 
1 145 0.00 0.06 0.88 0.06 3 0.12 0.21 1983.6 16.4 
2 189 0.71 0.18 0.12 0.00 3 0.29 0.49 1981.2 14.0 
3 76 0.11 0.89 0.00 0.00 2 0.11 0.16 1967.9 24.7 
4 146 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1966.2 23.3 
5 42 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1981.5 10.7 
6 30 0.06 0.94 0.00 0.00 2 0.06 0.20 1967.8 21.0 
7 73 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1977.1 19.9 
8 68 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 2 0.33 0.36 1969.8 26.4 
9 31 0.17 0.83 0.00 0.00 2 0.17 0.28 1960.0 25.7 
10 50 0.06 0.94 0.00 0.00 2 0.06 0.13 1970.7 12.6 
11 40 0.94 0.06 0.00 0.00 2 0.06 0.10 1962.7 19.7 
12 56 0.22 0.78 0.00 0.00 2 0.22 0.38 1968.0 25.3 
13 66 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1967.8 19.5 
14 27 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1962.2 22.6 
15 54 0.11 0.89 0.00 0.00 2 0.11 0.23 1958.4 24.9 
16 35 0.78 0.22 0.00 0.00 2 0.22 0.37 1963.6 17.3 
17 30 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1954.8 22.3 
18 38 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1958.1 25.8 
19 84 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1972.1 20.2 
20 40 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1982.5 12.2 
21 31 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1969.6 17.5 
22 57 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1951.6 26.0 
23 135 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1972.1 21.8 
24 67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1975.0 16.6 
Mean (N=24) 67.1 0.58 0.38 0.04 0.00 1.54 0.07 0.12 1968.5 20.3 
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Table A3: Correlation across the Fractionalization Indices (N=24) 
 Number of religions 1 if multiple religions 1 – (% of majority) 1 if multiple religions 0.914***   1 – (% of majority) 0.776*** 0.782***  ELF Index 0.857*** 0.857*** 0.959*** 
* p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table A4: Population Growth across Upazila 
 Total Muslim Non-Muslim 
 Population growth per year  Population growth per year  Population growth per year  
Name of Upazila 2001-2011 1981-2001 Difference 2001-2011 1981-2001 Difference 2001-2011 1981-2001 Difference 
Assasuni 0.8% 0.6% 0.2% 1.0% 1.1% -0.1% 0.1% -0.6% 0.7% 
Shyamnagar 0.1% 1.6% -1.4% 0.4% 2.2% -1.8% -0.7% 0.0% -0.7% 
Debhata 0.5% 2.2% -1.6% 1.0% 2.5% -1.5% -1.2% 1.1% -2.3% 
Kalaroa 0.7% 1.9% -1.2% 0.7% 2.0% -1.3% 0.4% 0.6% -0.2% 
Kaliganj 0.7% 1.2% -0.5% 0.9% 1.7% -0.7% -0.4% -0.5% 0.2% 
Tala 0.2% 1.4% -1.3% 0.4% 1.8% -1.4% -0.3% 0.7% -1.0% 
Satkhira Sadar 1.2% 2.6% -1.4% 1.3% 2.9% -1.5% 0.3% 1.3% -1.0% 
Source: Computed from Population and Housing Census 1981, 2001, and 2011. 
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Appendix Table A5: Peers in the Other Villages at the Pre-Cyclone Period 
  Risk Sharing Network in the Other Villages Trust in the Residents of the Other Villages 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation 0.516 0.559 0.347 0.202 0.035 0.029 -0.022 0.006 
(0.716) (0.562) (0.630) (0.646) (0.035) (0.024) (0.029) (0.026) 
  × Number of religions in the para -0.249    -0.009    
(0.170)    (0.015)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  -0.281*    -0.003   
 (0.157)    (0.015)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -0.369    0.224  
  (3.427)    (0.148)  
  ×ELF index    0.031    0.043 
   (1.362)    (0.082) 
Number of religions in the para 1.978    0.058    
(1.439)    (0.059)    
1 if multiple religions  0.890    0.018   
 (1.319)    (0.052)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   3.742    0.228  
  (5.468)    (0.228)  
ELF index    3.887    0.184 
   (4.507)    (0.150) 
Median height of inundation 0.186 -0.286 -0.072 0.165 -0.022 -0.033 0.036 0.001 
 (0.975) (0.832) (1.092) (1.115) (0.039) (0.035) (0.041) (0.041) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Columns (1) to (4) reports the OLS coefficients and Columns (5) to (8) reports the marginal effects at the mean, respectively. Clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table A6: Religious Fractionalization versus Proportion of Non-Muslim 
  Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.137** -0.052 -0.052 -0.063 -0.067 -0.062 -0.062 -0.072* 
(0.069) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.077) (0.050) (0.042) (0.039) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.099**    0.007    
(0.050)    (0.056)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  0.132**    -0.001   
 (0.052)    (0.069)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   0.781***    0.913**  
  (0.287)    (0.437)  
  ×ELF index    0.651***    0.587** 
   (0.224)    (0.264) 
  ×Proportion of non-Muslim -0.086 -0.104* -0.065 -0.130** 0.023 0.034 -0.072 -0.110* 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.050) (0.053) (0.063) (0.069) (0.048) (0.064) 
Number of religions in the para -0.154    0.075    
(0.110)    (0.152)    
1 if multiple religions  -0.164    0.132   
 (0.129)    (0.190)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -1.210**    -1.930**  
  (0.539)    (0.877)  
ELF index    -1.118***    -1.240** 
   (0.422)    (0.585) 
Proportion of non-Muslim 0.178 0.206 0.202 0.357* 0.026 -0.018 0.351 0.442* 
 (0.173) (0.186) (0.180) (0.206) (0.190) (0.217) (0.214) (0.250) Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
Table A7: Religious Fractionalization versus Community Size 
  Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.022 0.012 0.022 0.025 -0.092 -0.081 -0.030 -0.044 
(0.060) (0.057) (0.060) (0.064) (0.066) (0.057) (0.062) (0.061) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.050*** 0.026 
(0.016) (0.033) 
  ×1 if multiple religions 0.051*** 0.029 
(0.018) (0.035) 
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para) 0.481** 0.455 
(0.199) (0.304) 
  ×ELF index 0.223** 0.226* 
(0.096) (0.127) 
  ×Community size -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Number of religions in the para -0.057 0.031 
(0.052) (0.118) 
1 if multiple religions -0.017 0.081 
(0.054) (0.120) 
1 – (proportion of majority in the para) -0.753*** -1.125** 
(0.214) (0.559) 
ELF index -0.372*** -0.542* 
(0.112) (0.308) 
Community size 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table A8: Religious Fractionalization versus Proximity to India-Bangladesh Border 
  Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.062 -0.033 -0.019 -0.021 -0.050 -0.026 -0.017 -0.018 
(0.056) (0.044) (0.042) (0.046) (0.069) (0.057) (0.049) (0.055) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.045**    0.032    
(0.022)    (0.029)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  0.059***    0.039   
 (0.020)    (0.034)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   0.528**    0.780***  
  (0.242)    (0.300)  
  ×ELF index    0.255**    0.297** 
   (0.103)    (0.145) 
  ×1 if close to the border -0.023 -0.015 -0.042 -0.030 0.029 0.036 -0.005 0.015 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) 
Number of religions in the para -0.039    0.038    
(0.056)    (0.082)    
1 if multiple religions  -0.011    0.054   
 (0.059)    (0.108)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -0.570*    -1.100**  
  (0.299)    (0.561)  
ELF index    -0.295*    -0.426 
   (0.164)    (0.323) 
1 if close to the border 0.062 0.050 0.135 0.087 0.208** 0.187* 0.317*** 0.242** 
 (0.083) (0.082) (0.092) (0.084) (0.098) (0.100) (0.119) (0.113) Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table A9: Estimation with Controlling for Pre-Cyclone Socio-Economic Status 
  Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.087* -0.054 -0.047 -0.051 -0.084 -0.058 -0.050 -0.056 
(0.053) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.061) (0.048) (0.047) (0.045) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.045**    0.027    
(0.023)    (0.030)    
  ×1 if multiple religions  0.056***    0.029   
 (0.019)    (0.034)   
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   0.406**    0.519*  
  (0.194)    (0.300)  
  ×ELF index    0.246**    0.257* 
   (0.100)    (0.131) 
Number of religions in the para -0.021    0.045    
(0.062)    (0.093)    
1 if multiple religions  0.009    0.078   
 (0.061)    (0.114)   
1 – (proportion of majority in the para)   -0.478    -1.075*  
  (0.333)    (0.568)  
ELF index    -0.270    -0.481 
   (0.185)    (0.315) 
Pre-cyclone socio-economic status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table A10: Estimation without Controlling for Geographic Characteristics and Cyclone Damage 
  Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.085* -0.059* -0.052 -0.052 -0.058 -0.045 -0.037 -0.039 
(0.050) (0.036) (0.041) (0.041) (0.070) (0.057) (0.054) (0.052) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.040* 0.015 
(0.022) (0.031) 
  ×1 if multiple religions 0.051*** 0.013 
(0.020) (0.037) 
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para) 0.385** 0.434 
(0.193) (0.320) 
  ×ELF index 0.216** 0.192 
(0.103) (0.141) 
Number of religions in the para -0.019 0.061 
(0.061) (0.101) 
1 if multiple religions 0.022 0.101 
(0.061) (0.129) 
1 – (proportion of majority in the para) -0.439 -0.968 
(0.307) (0.628) 
ELF index -0.247 -0.411 
(0.179) (0.342) 
Geographic characteristics No No No No No No No No 
Cyclone damage No No No No No No No No 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table A11: The Impact on General Trust 
  Post-Cyclone General Trust 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
80th percentile of height of inundation 0.144* -0.031 0.009 -0.007 
(0.079) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) 
  ×Number of religions in the para -0.167*** 
(0.043) 
  ×1 if multiple religions -0.171*** 
(0.044) 
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para) -1.692*** 
(0.334) 
  ×ELF index -0.782*** 
(0.168) 
Number of religions in the para 0.193* 
(0.112) 
1 if multiple religions 0.217* 
(0.121) 
1 – (proportion of majority in the para) 2.495*** 
(0.732) 
ELF index 1.110*** 
(0.395) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table A12: Alternative Measure of Damages at the Para Level 
  Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mean height of inundation -0.152*** -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.098*** -0.152** -0.098** -0.127*** -0.121*** 
(0.052) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.074) (0.043) (0.039) (0.041) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.057* 0.051 
(0.030) (0.046) 
  ×1 if multiple religions 0.077*** 0.059 
(0.026) (0.051) 
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para) 0.576* 0.961*** 
(0.298) (0.357) 
  ×ELF index 0.315** 0.427** 
(0.141) (0.184) 
Number of religions in the para -0.021 0.007 
(0.062) (0.099) 
1 if multiple religions 0.006 0.031 
(0.061) (0.112) 
1 – (proportion of majority in the para) -0.403 -1.297** 
(0.345) (0.579) 
ELF index -0.216 -0.579* 
(0.183) (0.335) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Marginal effects at the mean are reported. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
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Table A13: Robustness to Outlier 
  Property Crime Victimization Violent Crime Victimization 
OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
80th percentile of height of inundation -0.074 -0.050 -0.043 -0.044  -0.077 -0.060 -0.052 -0.054 
(0.054) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045)  (0.070) (0.056) (0.053) (0.049) 
  ×Number of religions in the para 0.037*  0.020 
(0.021)  (0.036) 
  ×1 if multiple religions 0.048**  0.021 
(0.019)  (0.042) 
  ×1 – (proportion of majority in the para) 0.364*  0.510 
(0.191)  (0.341) 
  ×ELF index 0.210**  0.236 
(0.101)  (0.155) 
80th percentile of height of inundation ≥ 2 feet 0.148 0.349** 
(0.182) (0.161) 
  ×1 if multiple religions 0.204** 0.203* 
(0.091) (0.119) 
Number of religions in the para -0.024  0.067 
(0.060)  (0.115) 
1 if multiple religions 0.009 0.056 0.099 0.106 
(0.060) (0.068) (0.140) (0.111) 
1 – (proportion of majority in the para) -0.450  -1.094 
(0.308)  (0.664) 
ELF index -0.261  -0.477 
(0.178)  (0.383) 
Other independent variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
Columns (1) – (4), (6) – (9): coefficient, Columns (5), (10): marginal effects at the mean. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
